Federalist 10 | Politics and Parties
A primary source to explore the dangers of factions and how the Constitution was designed to limit their powers.
Federalist 10
Objectives
- I can understand the dangers that factions pose in a free society.
- I can evaluate the ways the Constitution’s design limits the dangers of faction.
Essential Vocabulary
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adversed |
hostile |
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aliment |
nourishment |
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expedient |
plan |
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subservient |
of secondary importance |
Building Context
When the Constitution was signed on September 17, 1787, it needed to be approved by ratifying conventions in nine of the thirteen states to take effect. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay wrote and published a series of essays in support of the Constitution known as The Federalist. These essays were published in New York newspapers because New York was a state, due to its size and location, whose ratification of the Constitution was critical.
In Federalist #10, James Madison wrote about the dangers of factions in a large republic with diverse views and interests, and addressed how the new Constitution would help alleviate those concerns.
Caption: The Federalist
Federalist #10
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Document Text |
Notes |
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AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction… |
A well-made form of government will prevent and/or mitigate the violence caused by factions in a country. |
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By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community. There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects. |
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There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests. It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency. |
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The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed… The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society… |
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The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government… It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good. |
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The inference to which we are brought is, that the CAUSES of faction cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its EFFECTS. If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. |
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When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed… |
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A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking… |
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The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended. The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country… |
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The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government; and it is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it… Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens |
Analysis Questions
- How does Madison describe a faction? Why does Madison think factions are dangerous in a free society?
- Describe the two ways Madison says the causes of faction can be removed. What are the problems with these two ways?
- Why does Madison argue that factions are part of human nature?
- How does Madison argue that representatives can “refine and enlarge” the views of the people?
- Explain why Madison states that a large republic helps prevent majority factions from easily forming and oppressing the rights of others.