Federalist 10, November 22, 1787 

Objectives:

• I can explain why the Framers believed a large republic would create a stable and lasting government that protected against the violence of faction.   
• I can develop an argument using evidence from primary sources. 

Building Context: After the Constitution was signed in Philadelphia in September 1787, a vigorous debate over its ratification began. Supporters of the new Constitution were known as Federalists. Anti-Federalists were opposed to the proposed Constitution because they feared it would centralize state power and individual rights. In order to help convince their fellow Americans of their view that the Constitution would protect freedom, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay wrote a series of essays in defense of the Constitution. The essays appeared in newspapers addressed to the people of New York and were signed with names that referenced famous statesmen in ancient history. In Federalist #10, James Madison, writing under the name Publius, explained why the Framers believed the new Constitution would create a stable and lasting form of government. 

For a summary of key ideas in Federalist 10, watch this Primary Source Essentials video.

Text	Vocabulary/Notes
To the People of the State of New York:  AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction…
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.	actuated: motivated   adversed: opposed to  aggregate: combined
There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: The one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects. There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: The one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.
It could never be more truly said, than of the first remedy, that it is worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction, what air is to fire, an aliment, without which it instantly expires. But it could not be a less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency. The second expedient is as impracticable, as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed…
…The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders, ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions, whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other, than to co-operate for their common good…
It is in vain to say, that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm…
The inference to which we are brought, is, that the causes of faction cannot be removed; and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects.
A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the union. The two great points of difference, between a democracy and a republic, are, first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended. The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen, that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good, than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose.	efficacy: effectiveness   delegation: handing over (of power), entrusting with power  discern: figure out  consonant: in agreement with
In the first place… if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice.
In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts, by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive merit, and the most diffusive and established characters.	suffrages: votes
The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens, and extent of territory, which may be brought within the compass of republican, than of democratic government; …The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens;…
Hence it clearly appears, that the same advantage, which a republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic…is enjoyed by the union over the states composing it.  The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular states, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other states:…  In the extent and proper structure of the union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government.	conflagration: large fire

 

Comprehension and Analysis Questions:

• What is the most important action a well-constructed government should take?  
• How does Madison define faction? In your own words, how would you define faction?  
• Why is faction inevitable? How do human nature and liberty contribute to factions? What form of government will help control the effects of factions? 
• How is a republic different from a democracy? How do representatives in a republic better protect against faction?  
• How does Madison think the size of a large republic protects against faction? Be sure to include your analysis of Madison’s phrase “refine and enlarge.”  
• Madison wrote Federalist #10 as a response to the Anti-Federalist argument in Brutus #1. What was Brutus’ main argument against the Constitution? How does Madison reply to this argument? 
• Which argument do you find more convincing? Explain.