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Federalist 52

Federalist #52, Hamilton or Madison as Publius, February 8, 1788

Building Context: When defending the Constitution as a replacement for the Articles of Confederation, Publius explained decisions made about the branches, positions, and powers. In Federalist #52, the House of Representatives is defended in detail. With the House as the largest elected body in the federal government, it gave rise to many questions. Federalist #52 addressed the requirements, term length, and direct election by the people as well as comparisons to state legislatures and historical examples of other legislative bodies.

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A representative of the United States must be of the age of twenty-five years; must have been seven years a citizen of the United States; must, at the time of his election, be an inhabitant of the State he is to represent; and, during the time of his service, must be in no office under the United States. Under these reasonable limitations, the door of this part of the federal government is open to merit of every description, whether native or adoptive, whether young or old, and without regard to poverty or wealth, or to any particular profession of religious faith  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

In order to decide on the propriety of this article, two questions must be considered: first, whether biennial elections will, in this case, be safe; secondly, whether they be necessary or useful.  
As it is essential to liberty that the government in general should have a common interest with the people, so it is particularly essential that the branch of it under consideration should have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people. Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence and sympathy can be effectually secured. But what particular degree of frequency may be absolutely necessary for the purpose, does not appear to be susceptible of any precise calculation, and must depend on a variety of circumstances with which it may be connected.  
Let us consult experience, the guide that ought always to be followed whenever it can be found. The scheme of representation, as a substitute for a meeting of the citizens in person, being at most but very imperfectly known to ancient polity, it is in more modern times only that we are to expect instructive examples.  
It is a received and well-founded maxim, that where no other circumstances affect the case, the greater the power is, the shorter ought to be its duration;  
The federal legislature will not only be restrained by its dependence on its people, as other legislative bodies are, but that it will be, moreover, watched and controlled by the several collateral legislatures, which other legislative bodies are not. … the House of Representatives from their duty to the people, and the means of influence over the popular branch possessed by the other branches of the government above cited. With less power, therefore, to abuse, the federal representatives can be less tempted on one side, and will be doubly watched on the other.